THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
107 § 38, states that, "Every contract on a negotiable instrument is incomplete and
revocable until delivery of the instrument for the purpose of giving effect thereto." See
Horn v. Nicholas, 139 Tenn. 453, 201 S.W. 756 (1917). It is not certain, however, that
there was no delivery. The Negotiable Instruments Law, § 191, clause 6, provides:
"Delivery means transfer of possession, actual or constructive, from one person to
another." Common law cases have held that for a constructive delivery of an instrument there need be no manual transfer or possession. Noble v. Fickes, 230 Ill. 594, 82
N.E. 950 (1907); Kelsa v. Graves, 64 Kan. 777, 68 Pac. 607 (1902); Bome v. Holies, 195
Mass. 495, 8i N.E. 290 (19o7); Ehrlichv. Sklamberg, 65 Misc. 5,139 N.Y.S. 3 3 7 (1909).
An undoubtedly true statement in the principal case would be that the assignee obtains none of the advantages of a "holder" under the Negotiable Instruments Law because he was not an indorsee. Negotiable Instruments Law, § i9, clause 7. In regard
to the rights of a transferee the Negotiable Instruments Law, § 49, provides: "Where
the holder of an instrument payable to his order transfers it for value without indorsing
it, the transfer vests in the transferee such title as the transferor had therein." Because
the words "for value" are in the statute, some courts take the narrow interpretation
that a gratuitous transferee does not have title even as between the maker and the
assignee. Bmd v. Maxwell, 4o Ga. App. 679, 150 S.E. 86o (1929); Moore v. Moore, 35
Ga. App. 39, 131 S.E. 922 (1926), where the assignment was by a separate instrument.
This requirement of value was made even in a state giving a seal the effect of a conclusive presumption of consideration. Code of Georgia, 1926, §§ 4219, 4241. However, section 49 might be extended by analogy to cover a gratuitous transferee.
Brannan, Negotiable Instruments Law (5th ed. 1932), 472. The term "for value" may
be interpreted as a requisite solely for the continuing clause: "and the transferee
acquires in addition the right to have the indorsement of the transferor." See Elmore v.
Harris,134 Okla. 282, 273 Pac. 892 (1928). Where a transferee is required to give value
to obtain title to a negotiable instrument a mere technical consideration will be
sufficient if value be defined as in the Negotiable Instruments Law, § 25: "any consideration sufficient to support a simple contract." This definition has been followed
by some courts by disregarding the Negotiable Instruments Law, § i9i, clause 12:
"Value means valuable consideration." Judy v. Steer's Adm'x, i99 Ky. 221, 250 S.W.
859 (1923); Jackson v. Carter, 128 S.C. 79, 121 S.E. 559 (1924); Marling v. Fitzgerald,
138 Wis. 93, i2o N.W. 388 (i909).

AsmLEY FoARD
Conflict of Laws-Determination of Validity of Inter Vivos Trust of Movables[New York].-H and W, domiciled in Quebec, entered into an antenuptial agreement
settling a sum of money on W. Subsequent to their marriage they entered into an
agreement whereby W gave up all rights under the previous settlement, and H conveyed to her an interest in a more valuable trust consisting of securities then in the
possession of a New York trust company, which was named trustee, and other securities turned over to the trustee by the agent of H in New York. Plaintiff, trustee in
bankruptcy of H, the settlor, brought an action against W to have the trust set aside
as void in its inception, on the ground that, by the law of Quebec where husband and
wife agree to maintain separate estates, neither spouse can transfer to the other, directly or in trust, a substantial part of his or her property. Held, two judges dissenting,
that the law of the situs of the trust res and the place in which the parties had intended

RECENT CASES
the trust to be administered controls; judgment for defendant affirmed. Hutchison v.
Ross, 262 N.Y. 381, 187 N.E. 65 (i933); for opinions below see Ross v. Ross, 137 Misc.
795, 243 N.Y.S. 418 (1930); 233 App. Div. 626, 253 N.Y.S. 871 (193i), noted in 32
Col. L. Rev. 371 (1932); Hutchison v. Ross, 233 App. Div. 516, 253 N.Y.S. 889 (i93i).
At an early date Anglo-American law seized upon the maxim mobilia sequuntur
personam and used it to decide the validity of inter vivos transfers of movables. See
Story, Conflict of Laws (Bigelow's 8th ed., 1883), §§ 376-81; Beale, Equitable Interests in Foreign Property, 20 Harv. L. Rev. 382, 394 (1907); Beale, Living Trusts of
Movables in the Conflict of Laws, 45 Harv. L. Rev. 969, 970 (1932). The maxim has
been rejected in favor of the situs theory as to transfers of tangibles and commercial
specialties. Disconto Gesellschaft v. U.S. Steel Corp., 267 U.S. 22, 45 Sup. Ct. 207, 69
L. Ed. 495 (1925); Goetschius v. Brightman, 245 N.Y. i86, i56 N.E. 66o (1927); Conflict of Laws Restatement (Proposed Final Draft No. 2, 1931), §§ 275, 277, 282, 379.
It is now confined chiefly to transfers upon death or by operation of law upon marriage;
see Conflict of Laws Restatement (Proposed Final Draft No. 2, 193), §§ 310, 325,
328.
Due chiefly to the strong precedents in favor of the domiciliary rule set forth in the
testamentary trust cases, Liberty NationalBank v. New EnglandInvestors Shares, 25 F.
(2d) 493, 495 (D.C.D. Mass. 1928); see Cavers, Trusts Inter Vivos and the Conflict of
Laws, 44 Harv. L. Rev. i6i, 162-63, 188-89 (1930); but see Bouree v. Trust Francais,
14 Del. Ch. 332, 346, 127 Ad. 56, 62 (1924), the law as to the validity of inter vivos
trusts has lagged behind in abandoning the domiciliary test. Cf. Mercer v. Buchanan,
132 Fed. 5oi (C.C.W.D. Pa., 1904); Swelland v. Swetland, 105 N.J. Eq. 6o8, i4 9 Atl. 50
(193o), affd. 107 N.J. Eq. 504, x53 Al. 907 (i93i); see Maynard v. Farmers' Loan &
Trust Co., 208 App. Div. 112, i6, 203 N.Y.S. 83, 86 (1924), affd. 238 N.Y. 592, i44
N.E. 905 (1924); but see Hullin v. Faur6, i5 La. Ann. 622 (i86o); Greenough v. Osgood,
235 Mass. 235, 237-38, 126 N.E. 461, 462 (1920); Conflict of Laws Restatement (Proposed Final Draft No. 2, 193 1), §315. The problem is further complicated by the addition of a third possible jurisdiction whose law might govern the validity of an inter
vivos trust-the place in which the trust is to be administered; Robb. v. Washington &
Jefferson College, i85 N.Y. 485, 78 N.E. 359 (i9o6); cf. Equitable Trust Co. v. Pratt, 1 7
Misc. 708, 193 N.Y.S. 152 (1922), affd. 2o6 App. Div. 689, i99 N.Y.S. 921 (1923);
but cf. Fowler'sAppeal, 125 Pa. 388, 17 At. 431 (i889). Some recent cases place strong
emphasis on the intent of the settlor, when it can be determined: Liberty National
Bank v. New England Investors Shares, 25 F. (2d) 493, 495 (D.C.D. Mass. 1928); cf.
Swelland v. Swetland, 105 N.J. Eq. 6o8, 149 At. 50 (1930), affd. 107 N.J. Eq. 504, 153
AU. 907 (i93 i). The law of the jurisdiction in which the trust agreement was executed,
although rejected in Equitable Trust Co. v. Pratt, 117 Misc. 708, 193 N.Y.S. 152 (1922),
affd. 2o6 App. Div. 689, i99 N.Y.S. 921 (I923), is considered in some cases in which it
coincides with other factors on which the court relies; see Mercer v. Buchanan, 132
Fed. 5oi (C.C.W.D. Pa., i9o4); Fowler'sAppeal, 125 Pa. 388, 17 Ad. 431 (1889).
The court in the instant case was also influenced by a New York statute, enacted
after the execution of the trust instrument, effectuating express declarations of settlors
that New York law should govern trusts of personal property located in New York.
N.Y. Cahill's Consol. Laws (193o), c. 42, § i2-a. Further, inasmuch as the trust had
been created to replace a marriage settlement, the emphasis on the situs and intent of
the settlor in the English cases construing such settlements, as contrasted with other

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
types of inter vivos trusts, may have been persuasive; see Cavers, Trusts Inter Vivos
and the Conflict of Laws, 44 Harv. L. Rev. 161, 183-86 (1930).
The case is interesting as illustrating the judicial technique of handling such problems; all factors present are weighed, and no single element is permitted to control the
decision as to what law will be applied. See 33 Col. L. Rev. L251, 1252 (1933). Apparently situs is at present the most persuasive single element, administration and intent are increasing in importance, and domicile and place of execution are declining in
value. It is as yet impossible to assure prospective settlors that any given trust will
definitely be held valid, and this result may be deplored; see 47 Harv. L. Rev. 350
(1933); however, if a substantial number of the factors enumerated point to the law of
a particular jurisdiction as controlling, it seems reasonably certain that that law will
be applied.
GERALDnIE W. LUTES

Conflict of Laws-Validity of Marriage Contracted in Violation of Lex Fori[Federal] .- Plaintiff, divorced in the District of Columbia on grounds of adultery, was
prohibited by statute (D.C. Code 1929, title 14, c. 3, § 63) from remarrying, but married
again in Florida. Her second husband later returned to the District of Columbia, and
there died. Plaintiff sued in the District of Columbia to enforce her dower interest
in his estate and recovered. Held, the decision of the District Supreme Court be reversed. Plaintiff, having contracted this second marriage in violation of the statute,
could not use the courts of the District to gain for herself any of the incidents of the
second marriage. Loughran v. Loughran, 66 F. (2d) 567 (D.C. 1933).
The court relies completely on Olverson v. Olverson, 54 App. D.C. 48, 293 Fed. lo15
(1923), where a divorced adulteress who had remarried was denied a divorce a inensa
et thoro from her second husband. There the court held that though the marriage would
be treated as valid to protect the interests of children or third persons, they would not
consider it as establishing any marital obligations between the parties. But the parties
in that case went outside the state for the wedding solely to evade the statute and returned immediately thereafter. In the present case, although it is not entirely clear
from the report, it appears that the parties had removed their domicil from the District
of Columbia prior to their wedding. Thus the court on the facts goes beyond Olverson v.
Olverson, 54 App. D.C. 48, 293 Fed. IO5 (1923), for the element of intentional evasion
of the law of the domicil is here missing. "The fact of such an intended evasion has
been repeatedly recognized as the basis of invalidity when otherwise validity would
have been declared." In re Stull's Estate, 183 Pa. 625, 630, 39 AtI. i6, 17, 39 L.R.A.
539, 542, 63 Am. St. Rep. 776, 778 (1898). Nelson v. Nelson, 200 Ill. App. 584 (r916);
Lincoln v. Riley, 217 Ill. App. 571 (1920); People v. Steere, 184 Mich. 556, i5 N.W.
617 (915); State v. Fenn, 47 Wash. 561, 92 Pac. 417 (1907); Pierce v. Pierce, 58 Wash.
622, io9 Pac. 45 (19io); Uniform Marriage Evasion Act, 9 U.L.A. 225.
The statute of the District of Columbia here involved only prohibits the marriage
of the guilty party to the divorce and is penal in nature. It follows that it is not entitled to extraterritorial effect and was no impediment to the validity of the second
marriage when celebrated. Ponsford v. Johnson, 2 Blatchf. 5I, Fed. Cas. No. 11,266
(1847); Inhabitants of Phillips v. Inhabitants of Madrid, 83 Me. 205, 22 Atl. 14, 12
L.R.A. 862, 23 Am. St. Rep. 770 (1891); Commonwealth v. Lane, 113 Mass. 458, 18
Am. Rep. 509 (1873); In re Crane, 170 Mich. 651, 136 N.W. 587,40 L.R.A. (N.S.) 765,

